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A critical feature of the mammalian visual system is 
the rapid orientation of covert attention toward ecologi-
cally important events. The allocation of covert attention 
precedes saccadic orienting that allows direct fixation of 
the event. Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that Dar-
winian selection has ensured that potentially threatening 
stimuli, such as the approach of a predator, receive visual 
processing priority. It is unsurprising, therefore, that re-
searchers have long been interested in the type of stimulus 
events that accrue such priority. Potential candidates in-
clude stimuli that suddenly move, appear, or loom toward 
the observer.
Experimental psychologists have typically assessed the 
issue of processing priority with a variation of a standard 
visual search task in which an irrelevant stimulus property 
(e.g., movement) happens to occur at the location of one 
of the search items. The item exhibiting the property, re-
ferred to as a singleton, is irrelevant in the sense that it is 
not predictive of the target location since the target is no 
more likely to occur at the singleton location than at any 
of the other items. Thus, for a display size of seven, there 
is a one in seven chance that the target will coincide with 
the singleton. If a processing benefit is observed when 
the target and singleton do happen to coincide, that stimu-
lus may be said to have accrued processing priority rela-
tive to the nonsingleton items. For example, in the onset 
singleton task (Yantis & Jonides, 1984; see Figure 1A), 
participants search for a target letter that appears among 
distractors. In a display of, say, seven search items, one 
of these items appears later than the others and thus con-
stitutes the onset singleton. Additionally, unlike the onset 
singleton, the remaining six nonsingleton items are cre-
ated by the transformation of figure 8s that are present 
before the search display appears. Results typically show 
that when the target happens to be the new item (i.e., the 
onset singleton), reaction time (RT) is relatively short in 
comparison with when the target is generated from one of 
the (old) figure 8s (e.g., Gellatly, Cole, & Blurton, 1999; 
Yantis & Jonides, 1984).
Initial results suggested that onset singletons were the 
only task-irrelevant, unique feature that could capture 
attention. For instance, Jonides and Yantis (1988) inves-
tigated whether a luminance singleton could also elicit 
capture (see Figure 1B). Their results showed that when 
a target element coincided with a luminance singleton, 
RT was not reduced. In another experiment, Jonides and 
Yantis showed that the same was also true of color sin-
gletons. Yantis and Egeth (1999) even showed that “rare” 
color singletons—that is, singletons that only appear 
 occasionally—also failed to capture attention. Further-
more, Hillstrom and Yantis (1994) have shown that motion 
singletons also fail to capture attention.
The fact that onset singletons consistently showed at-
tentional capture, whereas other types of singletons did 
not, led to the suggestion that the visual system is par-
ticularly sensitive to new objects (Yantis, 1993). However, 
more recent findings have cast doubt on the new-object 
priority hypothesis. For instance, Turatto and Galfano 
(2001) reported an experiment in which observers were 
required to detect a single target letter among seven dis-
tractors. Each item was presented inside a circle, one of 
which was a color singleton. Thus, for example, one green 
circle occurred among seven red circles (or vice versa). 
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A large body of work suggests that the visual system is particularly sensitive to the appearance of 
new objects. This is based partly on evidence from visual search studies showing that onsets capture 
attention whereas many other types of visual event do not. Recently, however, the notion that object 
onset has a special status in visual attention has been challenged. For instance, an object that looms 
toward an observer has also been shown to capture attention. In two experiments, we investigated 
whether onset receives processing priority over looming. Observers performed a change detection 
task in which one of the display objects either loomed or receded, or a new object appeared. Results 
showed that looming objects were more resistant to change blindness than receding objects. Crucially, 
however, the appearance of a new object was less susceptible to change blindness than both looming 
and receding. We argue that the visual system is particularly sensitive to object onsets.
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Unlike in previous color singleton experiments, RT fa-
cilitation occurred when the target letter appeared inside 
the unique color. Turatto and Galfano’s crucial variation 
appears to have been that display set size was not ma-
nipulated. In a follow-up study, Turatto, Galfano, Gardini, 
and Mascetti (2004) demonstrated that this color single-
ton effect was not apparent when set size functions were 
analyzed. Johnson, Hutchison, and Neill (2001) have also 
provided evidence that color singletons can capture at-
tention, while Franconeri and Simons (2003) and Abrams 
and Christ (2003) have shown how certain types of motion 
can do so. Finally, Kentridge, Cole, and Heywood (2004) 
reported that a singleton defined by local chromatic con-
trast attracted attention.
These findings have been taken as evidence that object 
onset is no more effective in marshalling attention than 
are other stimulus events. However, although these studies 
clearly demonstrate that other events do receive prefer-
ential processing, they do not reveal anything about the 
relative processing efficacy of such events in comparison 
with onset. In effect, the challenge to the special status 
of object onset has relied on the comparison of results 
from different studies or experiments. We believe that a 
more compelling demonstration of the relative efficacy 
of object onset in relation to other stimulus characteris-
tics would be one in which different stimulus events are 
pitted against each other within the same experiments or 
even within the same trials. Indeed, since object onsets are 
now known not to be unique in capturing attention, new 
emphasis should be placed on determining which visual 
events have primacy relative to others.
Recently, Cole, Kentridge, and Heywood (2004) and 
Cole, Kentridge, Gellatly, and Heywood (2003) ad-
opted this approach with the use of the change blindness 
paradigm. Change blindness refers to the phenomenon 
whereby observers often fail to notice a change to a dis-
play if the change coincides with other visual transients 
(e.g., Simons & Rensink, 2005). One method for induc-
Figure 1. The singleton paradigm. In each of the four panels, one of the items 
in the display (i.e., the singleton) is unique with respect to a particular attribute. 
Occasionally the target element and singleton coincide. Typically 500 msec 
elapse between the onset of the first step and the search display. No placeholder 
occurs with luminance singletons.
Step 1 Search Display
A
Onset Singleton
B
Luminance Singleton
C
Looming Singleton
D
Receding Singleton
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ing change blindness is to briefly present a single uni-
formly blank image between the original scene and the 
subsequent scene containing the change. When the image 
reappears, participants may be required to indicate what 
changed or where the change occurred. This one-shot 
procedure contrasts with the more common continual al-
ternation method whereby the two scenes are repeatedly 
presented alternately (with the blank image in between 
each) until the observer detects the change. The one-shot 
method essentially provides detection percentage correct 
data, whereas the continual alternation method provides 
RT data. Using the one-shot technique, Cole et al. (2004) 
compared the relative detectability of four different object 
attributes: appearance, disappearance, color change, and 
luminance change. Importantly, the low-level attributes 
of all the different stimulus properties were equated so 
that discriminability was the same for each. The results 
showed that object onset was least susceptible to change 
blindness. Furthermore, this effect held only for the onset 
of an object representation; onsets that did not create a 
new object did not accrue preferential processing.
Cole et al. (2004) concluded that the new onsets ac-
crued processing priority over color change, luminance 
change, and object offset. Indeed, it is our contention that 
the degree to which different stimulus attributes render 
that stimulus more or less susceptible to change blind-
ness provides an index of prioritization. This rationale is 
analogous to that of many other experimental paradigms 
in which relative primacy is used to assess and make in-
ferences about cognitive processes such as attention. For 
instance, facilitated performance at cued locations in the 
precuing paradigm is usually taken as evidence that at-
tention was located at the cued position (e.g., Posner & 
Cohen, 1984). This conclusion is based solely on the ob-
servation that RTs are shorter relative to those at uncued 
locations. Likewise, many demonstrations of object-based 
attention (e.g., Duncan, 1984) are also based on the fact 
that performance is increased for the discrimination or 
detection of stimuli located within one single object rela-
tive to stimuli distributed across more than one object. The 
same rationale also applies to visual search experiments 
in which asymmetries in performance provide an index 
of primacy.
The rationale for employing the change detection para-
digm does not, however, permit any conclusions regard-
ing automatic attentional capture. As with the precuing 
paradigm, object-based attention studies, and many visual 
search studies, the technique enables one to infer only rel-
ative priority. Indeed, Yantis and Egeth (1999) have shown 
that many stimulus properties (e.g., color) that are highly 
salient, in the sense that they can be easily detected when 
observers are set to search for the property, fail to capture 
attention when they are irrelevant to the observer’s task. 
Thus, if a phenomenally salient stimulus does not nec-
essarily capture attention in a bottom-up fashion, then a 
change to a display in the change detection paradigm can-
not in any way be said to do so.
The aim of the present research was to assess the new 
object priority hypothesis by comparing the degree to 
which a new object is resistant to change blindness in 
comparison with an object that looms toward the observer. 
Onset was compared with looming on the basis of a recent 
report that looming also captures attention. Franconeri and 
Simons (2003) employed a variation of the singleton para-
digm in which one of the items grew in size. This induced 
the illusion of the item’s looming toward the observer (see 
Figure 1C). Targets that coincided with the looming el-
ement accrued an RT benefit relative to targets that co-
incided with one of the nonlooming elements. Further-
more, this capture effect was not observed for stimuli that 
receded from the observer (see Figure 1D). Abrams and 
Christ (2005) have shown, however, that both looming and 
receding stimuli capture attention when simulated with 
stereo depth cues. They argued that it is actually motion 
onset that attracts attention (but see Franconeri & Simons, 
2005, for a reply). It is apparent, therefore, that new ob-
jects are not unique in their ability to capture attention. 
However, as noted above, the discovery that other stimulus 
properties are able to capture attention does not refute the 
hypothesis that object onset has a special status and may 
still be the most effective stimulus property with respect 
to processing priority. In the present report, we compared 
change detection performance for stimuli that (1) ap-
peared, (2) became larger, or (3) became smaller. Hence 
we induced the illusion of depth shift via size change. 
For clarity of presentation we shall refer to our stimuli as 
looming and receding. However, any differences we might 
observe in prioritization for each could be argued to be 
driven by the detection of size change rather than the de-
tection of a shift in depth. Indeed, it is quite possible that 
size change might be the cue that the visual system uses 
to register looming and receding.
EXPERIMENT 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to assess whether the basic 
effect whereby looming stimuli accrue enhanced process-
ing relative to receding stimuli (Franconeri & Simons, 
2003) could be obtained using the change detection para-
digm. Clearly, if the method is not sufficiently sensitive to 
demonstrate the looming/receding difference, then it would 
be unlikely to reveal any processing advantage for object 
onset when pitted against looming. Observers were given a 
one-shot change detection task in which one of the display 
objects either increased or decreased in size to induce the 
illusion of a shift either toward or away from the observer.
Method
Participants. Ten undergraduate psychology students took part 
and were paid £5.
Stimuli and Apparatus. On each trial of the experiment, from 
11 to 14 squares of varying color and luminance were presented at 
random locations inside a virtual rectangle measuring 8.5º in height 
and 10.6º in width. The squares measured either 0.9º or 1.3º along 
each side. In other words, the display consisted of small and large 
squares. These were presented on a light purple background. The 
color coordinates of the background, measured in L*u*v* color space 
(using a Cambridge Research Systems ColorCAL colorimeter), 
were 0.286 (u ) and 0.284 (v ). The ratio of small to large squares 
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was chosen pseudorandomly, with the restriction that at least 5 small 
or large squares would always appear. Thus any one trial was not 
dominated by either small or large squares. The squares would form 
two groups on either side of fixation with an approximately equal 
number appearing in each group. An example of the display is shown 
in Figure 2. The experiment was carried out in a single dimly lit 
room and was driven by a Pentium PC linked to an Eizo color moni-
tor running at 60 Hz. Participants were seated approximately 70 cm 
from the display and responded by pressing either the forward slash 
or backward slash on a standard keyboard.
Design and Procedure. A single factor (looming vs. receding) 
within-participants design was employed. Each trial began with the 
presentation of a fixation point for 1,000 msec before the appearance 
of the first image for 1,200 msec. A blank frame of 100 msec then 
followed before the onset of the second image for 1,200 msec. The 
blank frame then reappeared until the participant responded. For half 
the trials, one of the small squares became large when the display re-
appeared, whereas on the other half, one of the large squares became 
small. As with Franconeri and Simons’s (2003) size change stimuli, 
this induced the perception of an object’s having moved toward the 
observer or having moved farther away. Half of these changes oc-
curred on the left-hand side of fixation and half on the right. Par-
ticipants were asked to indicate whether they detected a change on 
either the right or the left side of fixation by pressing a right-hand 
or left-hand button. They were invited to guess if they did not detect 
any change. The beginning of a trial was initiated by the participant’s 
response on the previous trial. Participants were instructed to main-
tain fixation for the entire duration of each trial and were told that 
accuracy, not speed, was important. They were not told what types of 
changes would occur, only that a single change would occur across 
the two images. For every trial on which an object loomed, the same 
pair of images would be repeated with the presentation order of the 
two images being reversed to create a receding trial. In other words, 
a looming object on one trial would become a receding object on 
another, and vice versa. This important control ensured that neither 
looming nor receding objects had an unfair advantage in detection 
over the whole experiment. Thus, if, for example, a looming object 
had an advantage on one trial due to, say, its location nearer to fixa-
tion, this object would recede on another trial. Twenty practice trials 
were given, following a demonstration trial. One hundred twenty-
eight trials were then presented in the experiment. All trial types 
were presented randomly.
Results and Discussion
On average, participants detected a looming object on 
66% of the trials and a receding object on 54% of the 
trials. Each observer’s correct detection score for loom-
ing and receding was entered into a within-participants t 
test. The difference in detection rates proved to be signifi-
cant [t(9)  2.8, p  .02]. These data clearly show that an 
object that moves toward the observer is less susceptible 
to change blindness than is an object that moves farther 
away. This preferential processing for looming stimuli 
concurs with the findings reported by Franconeri and Si-
mons (2003). We can conclude, therefore, that the change 
detection procedure employed previously by Cole et al. 
(2003; Cole et al., 2004) is sufficiently sensitive to reveal 
the looming/receding difference.
EXPERIMENT 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate, again 
using the change detection paradigm, the comparative ef-
fectiveness with which object onset and object looming 
are detected. Given that both looming and onset stimuli 
capture attention, in Experiment 2, we pitted object onset 
and object looming against each other within the same 
experimental item set, in order to determine their relative 
processing efficacies. In specific terms, we predicted that 
if the appearance of a new object has a special status in 
visual attention, a smaller change blindness effect should 
occur in the object onset condition than in the looming 
object condition.
Method
Participants. Ten undergraduate psychology students who did not 
take part in Experiment 1 were paid £5 to participate in Experiment 2.
Stimuli and Apparatus. For the looming condition, every aspect 
of the stimuli was identical to those reported in Experiment 1. The 
new object consisted of a square that measured 0.9º along each side. 
In other words, the onset object was always a small square. As stated 
previously, when one compares the relative detectabilities of different 
stimulus properties in the change detection procedure, it is important 
to match the different stimuli for low-level characteristics. We there-
fore constructed the stimuli so that the size of the onset was the same 
as the increase in size of the looming object. Put another way, 576 
pixels changed color at the same location in both onset and looming 
conditions: In the former condition, this created the onset of an ob-
ject; in the latter condition, this created an increase in object size.
Design and Procedure. All aspects of these were as described 
for Experiment 1. Thus, observers were given a change detection 
task and were required to indicate whether the change occurred on 
the left or the right side of fixation. On half of the trials, a new object 
appeared; on the other half, an object loomed toward the observer.
Results and Discussion
Observers detected a looming object on 68% of the trials 
and a new object on 81%. Each observer’s correct detec-
Figure 2. The type of display used in the present experiments. 
On each trial of the two experiments, the image would occur for 
1,200 msec, offset for 100 msec, reappear for 1,200 msec, and then 
offset again. Participants were then required to indicate whether 
a change occurred on the left- or the right-hand side. When the 
image reappeared, one of the objects became larger or smaller 
(Experiment 1). This induced the illusion of movement either to-
ward the observer or away from the observer (i.e., looming or 
receding). In Experiment 2, either an object became larger or a 
new object appeared. Note that the actual display consisted of dif-
ferently colored objects against a light purple background.
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tion score for the new object and looming conditions was 
entered into a within-participants t test. This difference 
was significant [t(9)  7.8, p  .01]. This result clearly 
shows that the appearance of a new object was more resis-
tant to change blindness than an object that loomed. Im-
portantly, our data represent the first demonstration within 
a single experiment that object onset is significantly more 
efficacious with respect to prioritization of visual process-
ing than is object looming. This finding supports the claim 
that object onset has a special status in vision.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In two experiments, we investigated the degree to which 
object onset, object looming, and object receding are sus-
ceptible to change blindness. Experiment 1 showed that an 
object that loomed toward the observer was more readily 
detected than an object that receded. This finding concurs 
with data reported by Franconeri and Simons (2003), who 
showed that looming stimuli gave rise to efficient visual 
search, whereas receding stimuli did not. Thus, Experi-
ment 1 demonstrated that the change detection procedure 
produced a finding similar to that reported by Franconeri 
and Simons (2003). Experiment 2 then used this technique 
to assess whether the appearance of a new object would 
lead to facilitated visual processing in comparison with an 
object that loomed. The results showed this to be the case; 
object onset was more resistant to change blindness. We 
argue that this demonstrates visual processing priority for 
new objects over looming objects. Unlike previous stud-
ies, the present research assessed the new object priority 
hypothesis when onset was compared with another stimu-
lus property within the same experimental item set.
These results support the notion that the visual system 
is particularly sensitive to the appearance of new objects, 
with object onset receiving attentional priority over both 
looming and receding. However, it is important to note 
that the findings may additionally implicate mechanisms 
of visual short-term memory as well as attention. It is not 
entirely clear to what extent the change detection para-
digm engages primarily attention or memory processes. 
Since the degree of change blindness can be modulated by 
attentional factors (Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997), the 
phenomenon must be, at least to a certain extent, an atten-
tional effect by definition. At the same time, the paradigm 
of comparing one image with a subsequent image clearly 
requires memory. Indeed, a visual short-term memory 
mechanism may help to explain new object prioritization. 
Despite poor retention of much information within visual 
short-term memory, change in the spatial configuration 
of objects is relatively well retained (Simons, 1996). In 
the present Experiment 2, the spatial layout of objects al-
tered with the appearance of the new object. By contrast, 
no such alteration occurred when the old object changed 
size in the looming condition. Since new objects neces-
sarily change the spatial layout of a scene, correct change 
detection would therefore be greater on new object trials. 
Given this, the present data may actually reflect priority 
for representations of changes in spatial configuration, 
with facilitated new object detection being one of the 
consequences. This account could potentially explain all 
reported demonstrations of new object priority (e.g., Yan-
tis & Jonides, 1984). Alternatively, spatial layout changes 
may be the cue that the system uses to register the appear-
ance of new objects. Hence, rather than being epiphenom-
enal, new object priority would still have a special status 
in visual attention but would use spatial configuration as 
a cue.
Finally, although the present data demonstrate primacy 
for object onset, the results do not allow us to form con-
clusions about whether or not new onsets automatically 
capture attention. As we have stated in the introduction, 
our use of the change detection paradigm allows us only 
to assess which visual events have priority, rather than 
which events lead to capture per se. Clearly, there may 
well be a relationship between capture and the attenua-
tion of change blindness, but attenuation does not neces-
sarily demonstrate capture. We do, however, argue that 
since attentional capture and processing priority can be 
independent, the finding that new onsets may not neces-
sarily capture attention (e.g., Franconeri, Hollingworth, & 
Simons, 2005) does not refute the hypothesis that object 
onsets have a special status with respect to the prioritizing 
of visual events.
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